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Abstract 
Although Immigrant children represent approximately 3 percent of total U.S. child population, they remain the 
most vulnerable group in terms of access to public health insurance since the enactment of the “five-year-ban” 
for legal immigrants in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.  Children 
Health Insurance Reauthorization Act (CHIPRA) of 2009 provided states an option to receive federal funds to 
expand eligibility for immigrant children regardless of their length of residency. In this paper, we utilize the 
cross-state variation in policy environment before and after the adoption of CHIPRA to compare the 
differences in access to public health insurance among the low-income immigrant children. We find that 
adoption immigrant child option of CHIPRA has resulted 8 percentage points increase in health coverage for 
the target group, almost entirely contributed by equal increase in coverage through public health insurance. Our 
measure of estimated treatment effect is lower than what existing literature reports. We attribute the difference 
to the existing state-funded programs to support immigrant children among majority of the CHIPRA states. 
Increase in coverage entirely comes from the ranks of previously uninsured children; no evidence of crowding 
out from the private insurance was found. We also verify the lack of crowding out by estimating the labor 
market response among mothers of immigrant children.  




Approximately one out of every four children in the United States lives with at least one immigrant parent. 
The majority of them, around 85 percent, are U.S. citizen by birth; another 2 percent have gained citizenship 
status through the naturalization process. The remaining 13 percent children in immigrant families, who 
represent approximately 4 percent of all children in U.S., are foreign-born and noncitizen (Borjas, 2011). 
Although citizen children living in immigrant families are eligible for public health insurance coverage in 
a manner similar to the U.S.-born children of native parents, disparities in health insurance coverage 
between children of immigrants and children of natives remain substantial. For example, in 2008, about 12 
percent of native children were without any health insurance; about 20 percent of low-income children 
living with immigrant parents were without any health insurance.  The share of uninsured among low-
income immigrant children was alarmingly higher at about 39 percent, making this group as the most 
vulnerable group of children in terms of health risk1.The immigrant population may have difficulty in 
understanding the complex administrative process to enroll for public health insurance because of the 
language barrier that is reflected in higher uninsured rate for this group. The stigma and fear of becoming 
a “public charge”–  an immigrant who is primarily dependent on government support for subsistence – 
could also limit their participation (Bertrand, Luttmer, & Mullainathan, 1998). Most importantly, a number 
of policy reforms restricted the eligibility of this group for major public insurance programs like Medicaid 
or CHIP, which may have caused greater damage than other factors (Kaushal & Kaestner, 2005; Ku & 
Matani, 2001). 
Most notably, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), 
also known as welfare reform, contained key provisions for legal immigrants which changed their eligibility 
for major public assistance programs in a non-trivial manner. PRWORA categorized some legal immigrants 
as unqualified for public assistance programs based on nativity, date of arrival into the country, and length 
of residency. Specifically, post enactment immigrants, those who entered the U.S. after August 22, 1996, 
will not qualify for public benefit programs during the first five years after their arrival into the country. 
Several studies examined the effect of immigrant provisions in welfare reform on health insurance status 
(Kaushal & Kaestner, 2005), and labor market response (Borjas, 2003) in the immigrant population. 
Evidence suggests that children in immigrant families, regardless of their citizenship status, has less 
coverage through public health insurance following the passage of welfare reform of 1996 (Kaushal & 
                                                     
1 Author’s calculation based on 2010 CPS March Supplement using appropriate replicate weight. We call the foreign-
born non-citizen children living with immigrant parents as “immigrant children” throughout this paper; U.S-born 
citizen children of immigrant parents are called as “children of immigrants”.   
Kaestner, 2005; Ku & Matani, 2001, 2001; Lurie, 2008). The drop in health insurance coverage among 
eligible children living with immigrant parents after welfare reform, is called the “Chilling Effect” in the 
economic literature (Kaushal & Kaestner, 2005; Lurie, 2008; Watson, 2014). 
After welfare reform, many states responded by instituting state-funded substitute programs to provide 
health insurance to legal immigrant children who are not eligible for federal health programs like Medicaid 
or CHIP (Fortuny & Chaudry, 2011; Zimmermann, 1999).2 Bronchetti (2014) documents the higher degree 
take-up of public insurance, increased use of preventative care among first and second generation of 
immigrant children where the eligibility was expanded. However, the proportion of uninsured among low-
income immigrant children remained very large in the states which did not have a substitute program (see 
Table 2). The Children Health Insurance Reauthorization Act (CHIPRA) of 2009 provided states option to 
receive federal funds to provide public health insurance to low-income immigrant children regardless their 
length of residency in the U.S. In other words, CHIPRA-2009 lifted the dreaded “five-year-ban” for the 
immigrant children to become eligible for public health insurance. As of 2010, 22 states adopted the 
CHIPRA option. Saloner et al (2014) provides early evidence of CHIPRA adoption on health insurance 
status of low-income immigrant children. Following the enactment of CHIPRA, immigrant children living 
in states that expanded eligibility experienced an approximate 14 percentage points increase in the 
probability of having any health insurance. Institution of substitute state-funded programs following welfare 
reform resulted a substantial degree of the cross-state variation in eligibility for public insurance between 
PRWORA and CHIPRA. Expanded eligibility results increased health coverage and healthcare utilization 
among the immigrant children (Bronchetti, 2014).  It is important to acknowledge the differences in health 
coverage across states before the enactment of CHIPRA. By including pre-treatment period between 2000 
through 2008 we account for the cross-state variation in availability of public health insurance for 
immigrant children before the enactment of CHIPRA.3 We also include four years of post-treatment periods 
– from 2010 through 2013 – to measure the impact of CHIPRA more precisely.4 Our study suggests that 
accounting for the cross-state variation in eligibility for public insurance prior to the enactment of CHIPRA 
is critical. We find that estimated of the effect of CHIPRA is smaller, yet substantial,  than what Saloner et 
al (2014) reported. Our analysis suggests that existence of state-funded programs is also critical in the 
                                                     
2 In some counties in Florida, substitute state-funded program provided coverage to undocumented immigrants as 
well. In other states, undocumented immigrants were not eligible for coverage.  
3 In comparison, Saloner et al (2014) includes only two years of pre-treatment period: 2003 and 2007, which may be 
insufficient to capture the long term effect of state-funded policies on immigrant children’s access to public health 
insurance.  
4 This improves over Saloner et al (2014) which have one post-period (2011-12); while  Bronchetti’s (2014) study 
sample spans from 1998 to 2009 using restricted version of National Health Interview Survey.  
successful adoption of CHIPRA. Citizen children living with immigrant parents in the CHIPRA states also 
experience increased coverage following the passage of CHIPRA. Since this group of children was unlikely 
to benefit from CHIPRA option, we may suggest that institution of state-funded programs and adoption of 
CHIPRA, may have reduced the so-called “chilling effect”.  
Rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section describes the complex landscape of immigrant 
eligibility rules for public health insurance following the passage of PRWORA to the initiation of CHIPRA. 
After that, we synthesize related literature to motivate our research question. The next section describes the 
research design to evaluate the effect of CHIPRA on immigrant children’s access to public health insurance. 
After a brief description of Data, we present summary statistics to differentiate some key demographic and 
socio-economic features of immigrant and native children living in different states. We then present and 
interpret regression results. The Discussion section explores the determinants of the success of CHIPRA 
adoption by highlighting the cross-states variation in administrative requirements in the program and the 
role of the state-funded programs following welfare reform.  
PRWORA, CHIPRA and Immigrants’ Access to Public Health Insurance 
Throughout U.S. history, immigrants often were subject to discriminatory eligibility rules in accessing 
public assistance. For example, the Immigration Act of 1882 could deny foreign-born individuals’ 
admission to the United States if they were considered at high risk of becoming “public charges”(Nam, 
2011). Alien classification of foreign-born residents was designed to separate immigrants from citizens. 
The discriminatory regulations against immigrants was addressed, for the first time, when two states–
Arizona and Pennsylvania– were challenged before the Supreme Court in the early 1970s for providing 
public assistance to citizens or permanent residents, 15 years after their entry to the country (Zimmermann, 
1999). Later the Supreme Court declared these practices to be unconstitutional. Since then, legal permanent 
residents were generally eligible for public benefits in a manner similar to the U.S. citizens. The Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA) of 1996 changed the landscape.  
PRWORA was enacted to reduce fiscal burden by reducing welfare caseloads; and move recipients of 
welfare to the workforce as quickly as possible. It also instituted a lifetime time limits on welfare 
participation. A great deal of authority was granted to individual states to define eligibility rules for public 
benefits. Most importantly, PROWRA also contained few provisions applicable to legal immigrants’ 
eligibility rules. According to the new definition, “qualified immigrants” were those who were lawful 
permanent residents entering the country before August 22. These group, pre-enactment immigrants, 
continued to be eligible for public benefits like SSI, Food Stamp or Medicaid. Humanitarian immigrants 
were also included in this category regardless of their date of entry.5 Post-enactment immigrants – those 
entering the country after August 22 –were not eligible for federal-funded public assistance during the first 
five years after arrival. This rule is commonly termed as “five-year-ban” in the literature. Undocumented 
immigrants and those who are legally present in the U.S – students, tourists, visitors – were included in the 
“unqualified” immigrant category. Eligibility criterion for the post-enactment immigrants was further 
modified as the income and assets of their sponsor were “deemed” to be part of immigrant’s resources for 
up to 10 years. Legal immigrants, regardless of their length of residency, continued to be eligible for few 
public benefit programs: emergency Medicaid, School breakfast and lunch program, Supplemental 
Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children, also known as WIC (Broder & Blazer, 2011). In 
response, 17 states including the District of Columbia created substitute state-funded Medicaid programs 
to cater to the health needs of legal immigrants who are otherwise not eligible for federal-funded Medicaid 
as per immigrant provisions of PRWORA. Among these 17 states are some large immigrant states: New 
York, California, New Jersey, Illinois. Texas, despite containing a large immigrant population, did not 
created a substitute Medicaid program. Some counties in Florida  provided health coverage to most 
immigrants (Fortuny & Chaudry, 2011). Following the passage of welfare reform, existence of these 
substitute state-funded programs for immigrants created substantial cross-state variation in eligibility and 
availability of public health insurance (Bronchetti, 2014).   
Children Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act (CHIPRA) of 2009 incorporated a new option to 
allow states to receive federal funds for providing Medicaid or CHIP to lawfully residing immigrant 
children and pregnant women regardless of their date of entry or length of residency in the U.S. As of 
January 2010, 22 states adopted this option for providing coverage to immigrant children. Majority of the 
states, that previously provided health coverage to legal immigrant population using state-funded programs, 
adopted this new option. Another 20 states did not adopt CHIPRA option as of May 2014. CHIPRA also 
gave states option to provide coverage to immigrant pregnant women using the CHIP. Previously, pregnant 
women used to receive limited medical coverage under the “unborn child” option where the unborn child, 
who has no immigration status, is the recipient. This option is taken up by 6 states as of January 2012 
(Trusts, 2014).  
The complex interaction of immigrant eligibility rules and public policy reforms envisage a difficult 
scenario to measure the effects of these policies on immigrants’ access to public health insurance. High 
fraction of immigrants and citizen children living with immigrant parents fail to receive health insurance 
coverage for which they are eligible. Children in immigrant families who are foreign-born and noncitizen 
                                                     
5 Humanitarian Immigrant category includes Refugees, people granted asylum or parole or those withholding of deportation, 
survivors of human trafficking, certain abused immigrants and their children. Note that, this list is not exhaustive.  
remain the group with least health coverage even in states that instituted substitute programs. Bertrand et 
al (1998) identified few barriers to explain the trend: difficulty in obtaining and understanding information 
related to programs and application process due to cultural and language differences. Stigma can also limit 
immigrants to participate in these programs. Another proposition, chilling hypothesis, explains that the icy 
policy climate may have contributed towards the lower take-up rates. Following the passage of welfare 
reform, there was disproportionate reduction in Medicaid participation among eligible immigrant and 
citizen children of immigrant parents – “chilling” hypothesis has received sizeable citation as a potential 
contributor (Kaushal & Kaestner, 2005).  Federal immigration enforcement activity that was concurrently 
implemented along with welfare reform may have contributed to increasing the magnitude of “Chilling” 
effect (Broder & Blazer, 2011).  
We are interested in measuring the effect on public health insurance coverage using Medicaid or CHIP 
among the immigrant children following the enactment of CHIPRA. Immigrant children, despite their 
length of stay in the country, are now eligible for public health insurance. As of 2010, 22 states chose the 
option to use federal funds to provide health insurance coverage using either Medicaid or CHIP to otherwise 
eligible legal immigrant children regardless of their length of residency in the U.S. We also investigate the 
changes in the proportion of uninsured among US-born children of immigrants parents in policy states. 
Since this group – U.S.-born children living with immigrant parents – are not the actual target of the policy 
change, any effect on their participation in the public insurance program may be interpreted as reduction in 
the “chilling effect” for immigrant population in the CHIPRA states.   
Related Literature 
Empirical evidence on the effects of changes in eligibility rules for immigrants in PRWORA are well 
documented. Findings from most studies confirm the decrease in health coverage for immigrants following 
welfare reform with few exceptions. Borjas (2003) investigated the effects of PROWRA and subsequent 
emergence of several state-funded Medicaid programs on the health insurance coverage of nonelderly 
immigrant population. This group of immigrants did not experience a reduction in health insurance 
coverage. He attributed this to the simultaneous increase in employer-sponsored insurance take-ups. To 
validate this claim, he provided empirical evidence of a statistically significant increase in labor supply 
among nonelderly immigrant population following welfare reform. Interestingly, according to Borjas 
(2003), State-funded Medicaid substitute programs may not have contributed to the imminent reduction in 
public health insurance coverage as Medicaid cutbacks were offset by the increase in employer-sponsored 
insurance. Kausal and Kaestner (2005) argued that non-elderly immigrant population may not be a suitable 
target group for impact analysis since only a small fraction of this group may be eligible for Medicaid. 
Besides, determination of eligibility is not uniform across different sub-population among the larger 
nonelderly population. They argued that selection of nonelderly population as a reference for larger and 
diverse immigrant population in Borjas’s (2003) study may have obscured some adverse effects of 
PRWORA on immigrants’ public health coverage. On the contrary, unmarried single women and their 
children may be more vulnerable to changes in eligibility criterion. Kausal and Kaestner (2005) reports that 
low-educated, foreign-born, single women experience about 10 percentage point increase in the proportion 
of uninsured after welfare reform; US-born comparison group did not experience change in uninsured rate 
following welfare reform. They argue that the large increase in uninsurance among immigrant women 
population is an evidence of “chilling hypothesis” since provisions of PRWORA was binding on a small 
fraction of immigrants: mostly post-enactment immigrants which comprise a small group. Notably, the 
adverse effect on uninsurance was not statistically different between states with or without a state-funded 
Medicaid substitute program. The proportion of uninsured among US-born children of immigrants also 
increased by approximately 13 percentage points; citizen children of native parents had no statistically 
significant effect on health insurance coverage. Note that the eligibility criterion of U.S.-born children of 
immigrants is same as that of U.S-born children of natives; hence, drop in health coverage among this group 
lends support to the “chilling hypothesis”.  Increased federal immigration enforcement activities that 
occurred around the time of welfare reform may have created the “chilling effect” (Watson, 2014).  
Most researchers rely on the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the empirical analysis of effects of 
welfare reform on immigrants’ access to public health insurance (Borjas, 2003; Fix, Zimmermann, & 
Passel, 2001; Kaushal & Kaestner, 2005). CPS has one limitation: it cannot distinguish between the 
permanent (PR) and non-permanent residents (NPR); Survey of Income and Program Participation provides 
information about this status. Comparison between children of PRs with the children living with their non-
permanent parents could provide another evidence in support of “chilling effect”. Lurie (2008) , using data 
from SIPP, found that the proportion of uninsured children of non-permanent residents increased by about 
10 percentage points relative to the children living with permanent resident parents. This finding also adds 
to the narrative of “chilling effect”. Within the immigrant population, non-permanent immigrants may 
experience greater degree of fear and stigma to participate in public programs than those who are permanent 
residents.     
Most studies highlight the reduction in health coverage among children of immigrants who should not have 
been affected since welfare reform did not change their eligibility. Very few studies talk about the reduced 
eligibility for children in immigrant families who themselves are foreign-born and noncitizen. They lost 
eligibility for public benefit based on nativity or length of residency. Few states instituted substitute 
programs using local funds to offset the adverse shock of welfare reform.  Bronchetti (2014) uses restricted-
access micro data from National Health Interview Surveys (NHIS) for the years 1998 through 2009 to 
estimate the effect of cross-state variation in eligibility for public health insurance resulting from institution 
of substitute state-funded programs in some states after welfare reform. To overcome the endogeneity 
between health outcome variables and eligibility for public health insurance, she generates a simulated 
measure of eligibility for public insurance using the cross-state variation in the timing and extent of changes 
in the eligibility criterion. The simulated fraction eligible in a child’s state-year-age cell is then used as an 
instrument to reflect child’s individual eligibility in the second stage equation to measure effects on public 
insurance take-up or health care utilization. Findings of the study suggests a strong positive effect of 
expansion in eligibility on the likelihood of coverage using public health insurance among children in 
immigrant families: approximately an increase of 19.2 percentage points. Expanded eligibility also 
increases utilization of preventative care among children of immigrants.  
Although there was a surge in literature to estimate the effect of PRWORA on immigrant population, to 
our knowledge, there exists one study that examined the effect of CHIPRA on immigrant children’s access 
to public health insurance. Using 2003, 2007 and 2011-12 rounds of National Survey of Children’s Health 
(NSCH), Saloner et al (2014) examined the effect of CHIPRA on 4,769 low-income immigrant children. 
They estimated a difference-in-difference-in-differences regression model where the U.S.-born children of 
native parents were included as the other comparison group to isolate effects of other concurrent policies. 
They found that low-income immigrant children living in the states that adopted CHIPRA, experienced a 
14.9-percentatge-point increase in the probability of having any insurance largely contributed by increase 
in coverage through Medicaid or CHIP.  Their findings suggest resounding success of CHIPRA.  
In this study, we revisit the effect of CHIPRA on immigrant children’s access to public health insurance by 
combining the Current Population Survey’s March Supplement from 2000 through 2014. We hope to 
improve the finding of Saloner et al (2014) by explicitly accounting for the existence of a state-funded 
programs for majority of the CHIPRA states during the pre-treatment period. Immigrant children in the 
states where a state-funded program was available, used to be eligible for public insurance even before the 
adoption of CHIPRA; for these states, adoption of CHIPRA can be viewed as an expansion of the state-
funded programs, albeit Medicaid or CHIP are regarded better than any state-funded programs. Any 
increase in the expansion of public health insurance among low-income immigrant children following 
CHIPRA, hence cannot be attributed to the adoption of CHIPRA alone. Only states without a state-funded 
program for immigrant children will reflect sharp increase in the eligibility for public insurance among 
immigrant children. In summary, we expect the combined effects of CHIPRA to be smaller. Difficulty lies 
in isolating the net effect of CHIPRA.  
We expect our result to be more reliable as it is estimated using the largest sample of low-income immigrant 
children (15,129); it also captures four years of post-treatment periods following the enactment of CHIPRA. 
To further illustrate the contribution of state-funded programs on the success of CHIPRA adoption, we 
compare the performance of individual states that adopted CHIPRA. Our analysis suggests that existence 
of state-funded programs is a pre-requisite for the success of CHIPRA adoption.  
Research Design 
As of 2010, 22 states adopted the CHIPRA option to provide public health insurance coverage to low-
income noncitizen immigrant children regardless of their length of residency in the U.S. We call them 
CHIPRA states or policy states interchangeably.  As of 2014, 20 states did not select the CHIPRA option 
for their immigrant children population (Trusts, 2014). Some states – Alaska, Florida– provides some for 
immigrant children using separate program, however scale of those programs are unknown. Together, these 
states are called non-CHIPRA states or non-policy states alternatively. Few other states, opted for CHIPRA 
option or got approved for the CHIPRA option between 2010 to 2013. In our analysis, we exclude this 
states. The main focus of the policy is to provide public health insurance to low-income noncitizen 
immigrant children. Our treatment group comprise the low-income immigrant children living in the states 
that adopted CHIPRA. Low-income immigrant children living in states that did not opted for CHIPRA 
option are considered as the comparison group. 
We use the Difference-in-Differences (DD) method to evaluate the causal impact of CHIPRA on health 
insurance coverage for the immigrant children. DD method compares the average changes in the outcomes 
for treatment and control group before and after the policy change. Since, immigrant children living in non-
CHIPRA states are unlikely to be affected by CHIPRA, any effect in the post period on this group will 
reflect effects of other individual or state-specific variables on the outcome of interest for this group. As 
we subtract the differences in mean outcome of the comparison group from the mean outcome of the 
treatment group before and after the enactment of CHIPRA, we obtain the causal impact of CHIPRA. This 
approach can be implemented using a simple regression framework: 
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑃𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑃𝑅𝐴 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇)𝑖𝑠𝑡 +  𝛤 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜆𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
We estimate this model for the low-income immigrant noncitizen living in either CHIPRA states or non-
CHIPRA states. 𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑃𝑅𝐴 represents a dummy variable equal to 1 for the states that adopted option to 
receive federal funding to provide Medicaid or CHIP to legal immigrant children regardless of their length 
of residency. The variable 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 is equal to 1 in the years following the enactment of CHIPRA. For all the 
states in our analysis, CHIPRA was adopted by the year 2010. Our post-period includes 2010-2013. In 
addition, we include vector of individual covariates like age, race, mother’s education, log of family 
income, employment status of the household reference person, years of residency in the United States. To 
account for variation in macroeconomic environment across states we include the state-unemployment rate. 
Other unobserved effects are adjusted by including the state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at the state level.  
Here, 𝛽1 represents the average value of the outcome variable in non-CHIPRA states prior to the enactment 
of CHIPRA. Coefficient on 𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑃𝑅𝐴  dummy variable, 𝛽2 reflects the difference in outcome between 
CHIPRA states and non-CHIPRA states in the pre-period. Any difference in outcome variable for the non-
CHIPRA states between pre and post-period will be captured in the parameter 𝛽3. Our parameter of interest 







𝛽4 estimates the average effect of CHIPRA adoption on health insurance coverage of the immigrant children 
living in the CHIPRA states. Using the Immigrant children living in the non-CHIPRA states as a 
comparison group also has its disadvantages. For example, health infrastructure in those states could be 
systematically different than that in the CHIPRA states. As a solution, we may limit the sample to CHIPRA 
states only and use another group of children – U.S.-born children of natives parents – unlikely to be 
affected by the adoption of CHIPRA as a comparison group. It can also be argued that health outcome 
variable of U.S.-born children of native parents may disproportionately benefit from other policies 
compared to the immigrant children living in the same states. We also estimate difference-in-difference-in-
differences (DDD) model to isolate the effect of CHIPRA adoption by including the second comparison 
group, U.S.-born children of natives, living in both states. The regression model for triple difference is the 
following: 
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑃𝑅𝐴 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛼1𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑃𝑅𝐴 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑃𝑅𝐴 ∗ 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦
+  𝛼3𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑃𝑅𝐴 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 +  + 𝛤 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜆𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
The coefficient of interest, 𝛼4, the triple interaction term is essentially the difference between two DD 
model. The first DD model is same as designed earlier involving immigrant children living in different 
states with different policy environment. The second DD compares the U.S.-born children in CHIPRA 
states to their counterpart in non-CHIPRA states. This DD estimate should be zero since policy is not 
targeted at them. However, other provisions of CHIPRA may have some impact on their health insurance 
coverage. Thus, the difference of these DDs will present another measure of the effect of CHIPRA on 
immigrant children. 
𝛼4 = [(𝑌 𝐼𝑀𝑀




−  (𝑌 𝐼𝑀𝑀





−  [(𝑌 𝑁𝐵




−  (𝑌 𝑁𝐵





We are also interested to examine the health insurance coverage of another group of children: U.S.-born 
children of immigrants. This group is unlikely to be affected by adoption of CHIPRA directly. On the 
contrary, they are eligible for public health insurance like the U.S.-born children of native parents. Earlier 
literature found evidence that, despite their eligibility, disproportionately larger fraction of children of 
immigrant remain uninsured (Kaushal & Kaestner, 2005). However, decade long existence of these state-
funded programs is expected to create a positive environment for the immigrant families. If children of 
immigrants in the CHIPRA states display differential public health coverage compared to the children of 
immigrants in the non-CHIPRA states, we may suggest that, state-funded programs may have reduced the 
dreaded “chilling effect”.  
One crucial identification strategy for the validity of DD estimate is the assumption of “common trends”. 
This assumption implies that average change in the outcome variable would have been same for both 
treatment and comparison group in the absence of the policy. To test the common trend assumption, we can 
estimate the following regression model that limits the sample to pre-treatment periods and includes a trend 
variable to the regression. The coefficients of interaction terms between trend variable and treatment 
variable are expected to be zero or statistically insignificant when common trend assumption is satisfied.   
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝜆𝑡  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 
2008
𝑡=2000
𝛽0 𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑃𝑅𝐴 + ∑ 𝛿𝑡  (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡  ∗ 𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑃𝑅𝐴
2008
𝑡=2000
)  + Γ 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡 
Violation of the common-trend assumption will pose question about validity of the DD estimate. Presence 
of any differential time trends in the pre-treatment period may suggest that the estimate of DD may not 
reflect a causal effect on the outcome of interest. It also suggests that the policy environment may have 
been different between policy states and non-policy states even prior to the initiation of policy of interest. 
Many CHIPRA states had state-funded programs for immigrant children which make the test for common-
trends more critical for this study.  
We check whether results from the DD are robust by conducting several sensitivity analyses. First, we add 
observable individual and state-specific covariates in the regression specification to see if results are similar. 
To account for the serially correlated standard errors due to group structure of the data, we cluster standard 
errors around the state-level as prescribed by  Angrist and Pischke (2009) . Standard errors may still remain 
correlated because of inclusion of multiple time points to estimate the pre-and post-intervention means 
(Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2002). Estimation of the DD using other groups which are unlikely to 
be affected by the enactment of CHIPRA is another way to validate the DD findings. Average treatment 
effect from these models should not be different from zero. However, a non-zero DD estimate in the other 
model might suggest that the original DD estimate may not be unbiased. Finally, we estimate the DDD 
model which provides another test of sensitivity. Interestingly, several of our DD estimates can be 
algebraically obtained from the DDD model.  
Data and Descriptive Statistics 
For this study, we use the Current Population Survey (CPS) conducted by U.S. Census. The CPS is a 
nationwide survey that provides vital demographic, social and economic data for a large sample of 
American households on a monthly basis. Data on health insurance coverage is collected through the 
Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC)6.  Since 1976, ASEC is supplemented with an additional 
6,500 Hispanic households. To improve the state estimate of Children’s Health Insurance coverage, ASEC 
incorporated another sample expansion: a sample of 19,000 households known as CHIP sample. Total 
sample size for the ASEC is about 98,000 households. Data on birthplace of the individual and their parents 
and individual-level citizenship status allows us to allocate the children by their own nativity and that of 
their parents.  
Our unit of analysis is the immigrant children living in a family where at least one of the parents is 
immigrant. 7 Some modifications are made to identify members of a family who are relevant for the analysis 
of health insurance coverage.8 For example, Single adults, regardless of their relationship to the household 
reference person, living with no children of their own are assigned to a different family of their own, since 
their eligibility for public or private insurance is not a function of income or nativity of the household 
reference person. Similarly, parents or sibling of the household reference person are not included in the 
family unit since they cannot be considered for the private health coverage as a dependent through the 
household reference person.  
                                                     
6 ASEC is also referred as March Supplement since initially, it was added to the CPS in March each year. Since 2001, ASEC had 
been expanded from February through April. Persons, 15 years old or over, residing in sample households — Individuals, regardless 
of their interrelationship, residing in a physical address make up Household units —  are interviewed. Information is also collected 
for the children living in these housing units. A monthly CPS file contains approximately 150,000 records.  
7 The US Census Bureau define “family or a family household” as consisting of a householder and all those persons living in the 
household unit who are related by marriage, birth or adoption. According to the Official poverty guidelines, primary family and 
related subfamilies within a given household as one family. This family’s income is compared with the appropriate poverty 
threshold to compute poverty status of the given family. 
8 Recent developments in this area argues that Health Insurance Unit (HIU) is regarded as a better unit of analysis than a family 
because conventional family unit may not be consistent with the definition of a family unit relevant for private or public insurance 
programs. IPUMS now provides a separate identification for the Health Insurance Unit (HIU). There is considerable overlap 
between the construction of HIU and the census definition of a family unit – HIU reflects the complicated interrelationship within 
a family that is relevant for public and private insurance coverage.   
The immigrant children comprise a small fraction of total child population – approximately 3 percent. 
However, in states that have adopted CHIPRA option, immigrant children represent 5.7 percent of child 
population living below 300 percent of federal poverty line. Share of low-income immigrant children in 
states that did not adopt CHIPRA is about 3.2 percent at baseline.9   To overcome the small sample size we 
pool CPS-ASEC supplements between 2000 to 2008 for pre-treatment. For post-treatment period, we 
combine data from 2010-2014.10The main variable of interest is the status of health insurance coverage and 
its sources. In CPS, respondents are asked about their health insurance coverage for the previous year. 
Hence our, pre-treatment period spans from 1999 through 2008; post-treatment years cover between 2010-
2013. This improves the findings of Saloner et al (2014) which included only one post-treatment period 
(2011) and two pre-treatment period (2003, 2007). In Table 2, we compare demographic and socio-
economic characteristics of immigrant population living in CHIPRA states and non-CHIPRA states. About 
64 percent of the immigrant child in CHIPRA states are Hispanic; In non-CHIPRA states about 72 percent 
are Hispanic. In non-CHIPRA states, mothers of immigrant are more educated than mothers of immigrant 
children in CHIPRA states. More immigrant children in non-CHIPRA states live below poverty: about 45 
percent; average family income is also lower in non-CHIPRA states. Although, they are more vulnerable 
in terms of economic means, share of uninsured at baseline is about 16 percent higher than immigrant 
children in CHIPRA states. Coverage through private insurance are not very different among immigrant 
children in these groups, but the share of children with public insurance in CHIPRA states is about 27 
percentage point higher at baseline. This reflects the effect of the state-funded programs in most CHIPRA 
states. As a comparison group, in Table 3, we compare the characteristics of U.S.-born children of native 
parents living in policy state and non-policy state. Health insurance coverage among native children are 
very similar. It suggests that, there is lack of support in the non-CHIPRA states for the low-income 
immigrant children.  
Regression Results 
Immigrant Children 
We observed in the previous section that low-income immigrant children living in the states that adopted 
CHIPRA option have better health insurance coverage at baseline. In this section, we present the estimated 
effect of CHIPRA adoption on the health insurance coverage of low-income immigrant children using 
                                                     
9 The estimates are author’s calculation of weighted mean for the year 2008.  
10 Another option could have been American Community Survey (ACS) which contains a large sample. ACS could provide sizeable 
sample of immigrant children from the CHIPRA states which are not the traditional gateways states. However, the information 
about health insurance coverage is included since 2008 which limits our pre-treatment period. So, we do not use ACS for this study.  
Difference-in-Differences model. Simple linear probability model is estimated that has the specification to 
test pre- and post-period test using a comparison group. Three measure of health insurance status is 
examined: 1. whether the child has any health insurance coverage, 2. Whether the child is covered by any 
pubic health insurance, and 3. Whether the child has health insurance through private insurance including 
employer sponsored health insurance. All the regression model controls for age, race, education level of the 
mother, employment status of the household reference person, total number of children in the family. State 
unemployment rate, state fixed effects and year fixed effects are also included in the regression model. 
Standard errors are clustered at state level. To implement the Difference-in-Differences design each DD 
regression includes a Post dummy equal to 1 for the post periods. The indicator variable CHIPRA is equal 
to 1 if the target children lives in one of the CHIPRA states.  
Before each DD regression we test for the common-trend assumption in the regression framework. For 
example, Table 4 presents regression results for the test for common-trend for our key DD models.  Each 
column presents the regression result for the common trend for the specific outcome of interest. It shows 
that in most cases, there is no difference in time-trends in the pre-period between treatment group and 
comparison group. There are cells are statistically different from zero in the common-test regression for 
public health insurance coverage among immigrant children, just prior to the enactment of CHIPRA. This 
may suggest anticipation prior to the policy change. The other plausible explanation is that public health 
insurance coverage increased in the CHIPRA states prior to the enactment of CHIPRA because of the 
existence of state-funded programs to support the immigrant children. It should also be noted that, U.S. 
economy was suffering from the economic recession which may have disproportionately affected the 
immigrant population. Since these states had programs to provide health coverage to immigrant children, 
take-up rate increased in these states as parents of immigrant children may have been displaced from work. 
On the contrary, most non-policy states did not have a state-funded programs to support immigrant children. 
In the wake of economic downturn, immigrant children’s will not be able to find coverage in these states. 
This may have resulted some degree of common trend in year 2007 and 2008. One potential solution to 
overcome the common trend and obtain causal effect of the policy, we may exclude the years that had 
economic recession by limiting pre-treatment period between 2000 to 2006. This exercise, provides 
evidence that there is no evidence of differential time trend between treatment and control group of children 
before the policy was adopted.  
In Table 5, the regression estimates from various the DD models are presented. For example, for the first 
DD model the treatment group is the low-income immigrant children living in policy states. The comparison 
group for this model is the group of low-income immigrant children living on non-policy states. Estimates 
from this model suggests that for the low-income immigrant children living in the policy states, probability 
of being uninsured reduced by about a statistically significant 8 percentage points. The reduction in 
uninsurance can be attributed to the increase in the probability of being covered using public insurance. 
Column 2 in Table 5 shows that following the passage of CHIPRA, probability of having a public health 
insurance coverage for the low-income immigrant children in policy states increased by about 7 percentage 
points. No evidence of crowding out has been found, since the coefficient on the interaction term in the 
third regression is statistically insignificant. Similar results can be obtained when we restrict the pre-
treatment period between 2000-2006 to remove the years that suffered the economic recession. In summary, 
estimate in the difference-in-differences regression in the first DD model suggests that adoption of CHIPRA 
have benefited the most vulnerable group of children – low-income immigrant children living in the policy 
states. When we accounted for pre-treatment period between 2000 to 2008, our measure of average 
treatment effect of CHIPRA is approximately half of what Saloner et al. (2014) reported. This may be 
attributed to our inclusion of longer pre-treatment period when most CHIPRA states had substitute 
programs for immigrant children suing local funds.  
Children of Immigrants  
In this section we present the regression result that examines the effect of CHIPRA on the U.S.-born 
children of immigrants (See Table 5, column 5 through 7). Although this group may not benefit directly 
from the adoption of CHIPRA, assessment of their health insurance status reveals about the positive 
spillover effect of CHIPRA adoption. When we estimate similar regression to compare children of natives 
in CHIPRA states to the outcomes of children of natives in non-CHIPRA states, we observe that no effects 
of CHIPRA on children of natives, which is expected (Table 5 column 8 through 10) . 
We estimate several DD regression models for this group. First, we compare the health insurance status of 
the low-income U.S.-born children of immigrants in policy states with a similar group in non-policy states. 
This result is exhibited in Table 5 which suggests that following the passage of CHIPRA, children of 
immigrants in policy states did not show any change compared to the comparison group. Then, we compare 
the health insurance status of the children of immigrants in policy states with that of U.S. born children of 
native parents living in the same states. Note that both the groups are not the actual target of the new policy; 
however, both groups may benefit from other provisions of CHIPRA. Results of the regression is presented 
in Table 6. Note that the treatment group in this regression is 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 , which equals 1 for children of 
immigrants, 0 for children of natives. This result suggests that children of immigrants benefit from the 
CHIPRA adoption. The probability of not having any health insurance has decreased by 4 percentage points 
for the children of immigrants. The reduction can be associated with a simultaneous increase in the 
likelihood of having coverage through public insurance. Some evidence of crowding out can be observed 
in this regression. Another model where we compare the children of immigrants in non-CHIPRA states 
with health coverage to the children of natives in non-CHIPRA states (Table 6 column 5 through 7) we 
observe no difference in health insurance status after the passage of CHIPRA.  
How do we then interpret the differential outcome for children of immigrants in policy states compared to 
the native children? We may suggest that other provisions of CHIPRA may have benefited the children of 
immigrants more than the native children. Another interpretation can be made: adoption of CHIPRA is 
indicative of the accommodative policy environment in these policy states. Existence of state-funded 
programs to support the vulnerable immigrant children adds to this explanation. Kausal and Kaestner (2005) 
argued for the existence of “Chilling effect” by estimating the reduction in health insurance among children 
of immigrants despite the existence of state-funded substitute program. We would like to infer that existence 
of state-funded programs over the decade following the passage of PROWRA, have created an 
accommodative environment or reduction in the “chilling effect” for the immigrant population. Disparity 
in health coverage remains high among children of immigrants compared to the children of natives in non-
CHIPRA states.  
Labor Market Response for the Mothers of Immigrant Children 
Expansion of eligibility in the public health insurance program has been linked to labor market effects in 
the literature. Increase in coverage through public health insurance is often associated with a reduction in 
coverage through private insurance. Negative labor market response is often identified as the mechanism 
through which the crowding out takes place. Economic literature contains many studies that examined the 
effect of public insurance eligibility expansion on labor market outcomes of mothers (Dave, Decker, 
Kaestner, & Simon, 2015; Tomohara & Lee, 2007). In this study, we provide the effect of CHIPRA adoption 
on the labor market response of single mothers and married mothers of the immigrant children (Table 8). 
Most mothers of immigrant children are themselves foreign-born, noncitizen. By construction, analytic 
sample includes families below 300% federal poverty line. As a comparison group citizen mothers of U.S.-
born children are selected. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we found that adoption of CHIPRA 
that provides public health insurance to low-income immigrant children, has no effect on the labor supply 
decisions of the mothers of immigrant children. This finding is consistent with our finding that CHIPRA 
adoption does not cause crowding-out of private health coverage. We cannot extend the analysis for the 
group of mothers whose income is close to the income eligibility threshold since majority of the immigrant 
families live below 300 percent of the federal poverty line. Public benefit for the immigrant population 
remains limited following the passage of PRWORA. As a group they are more vulnerable and negative 
labor market response is not expected even after the availability of public health insurance for their children.  
Sensitivity Analysis  
We conduct several modifications to the regression specification for DD model to find that the average 
treatment effect remains unchanged. When standard errors are clustered at the state level, t-statistics became 
less inflated, but estimate was statistically significant. Estimation of DD model with group of children 
unlikely to be affected by the adoption of CHIPRA provides a test of sensitivity. The estimated treatment 
effect for this DD model is expected to be zero or statistically insignificant. When we compared U.S.-born 
children of native parents living in policy states to a similar group of children living in non-policy states, 
we found that there was no difference in their health insurance status after the passage of CHIPRA. Finally, 
we estimated the Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences model (DDD) by including U.S.-born children 
of native parents for isolating another source of variation and check the robustness of DD models (see Table 
7). Although, the DD involving U.S.-born children of native parents was zero, the results of DDD model 
give expected sign, but they are not statistically significant. The DD estimates can be obtained algebraically 
from the DDD model. We suspect that addition of second control group may have inflated the standard 
errors of the DDD model. Another possibility is that the U.S.-born children of native parents may not be a 
good candidate to compare health insurance outcomes of low-income immigrant children following the 
passage of CHIPRA. Since CHIPRA may have other provisions that are relevant for the U.S.-born children 
of natives.  
Discussion: 
Immigrant provisions included in PROWRA has been well documented to limit access to public health 
insurance for low-income immigrant children. Early evidence suggested a reduction in health insurance 
coverage for children of immigrant to the magnitude of about 10 percentage points (Kaushal & Kaestner, 
2005). Surprisingly, the take-up rate of the public health insurance among eligible U.S.-born children of 
immigrant parents also showed a decline by the same magnitude. This should not have happened since 
these group of children are not restricted by the immigrant provision of welfare reform. Economists termed 
this as “chilling effect”. Many states instituted state-funded programs to provide health insurance coverage 
to immigrant children who are deemed ineligible by the PROWRA. Long term effects of instituting the 
state-funded programs for immigrant children has been examined in the literature only recently by 
Bronchetti (2014). It is expected that these programs will not only provide health coverage to the low-
income immigrant children but will also create a positive environment for the immigrant families. In 2009, 
Children’s Health Insurance Reauthorization Act included a option for states to receive federal funds to 
provide public health insurance coverage to low-income immigrant children regardless of their length of 
residency in the United States. 22 states, as if 2010, adopted the new option. Among them, 15 states, had 
substitute state-funded programs.  
Evaluation of the adoption of CHIPRA also shows the long term effect of these state-funded programs. 
Even before the adoption of CHIPRA, these states had lower uninsured rate among low-income immigrant 
children compared to our comparison group, low-income immigrant children which did not opted for the 
CHIPRA option. Increase in take-up rate of public insurance following CHIPRA should be interpreted 
cautiously since the effect is a combined effect of state-funded programs and additional federal funds for 
opting for CHIPRA immigrant child option. As a evidence, we explicitly test for the common-trend and 
cannot rule out the evidence of common-trend in some pre-treatment years, between 2007 to 2008. When 
we restrict our pre-treatment sample between 2000-2006, we replicate similar result as of Saloner et al 
(2014). The evidence of common-trend in the years 2007 to 2008 may also be explained through the 
existence of state-funded program in most CHIPRA states. When U.S. economy was going through 
economic recession, immigrant population may have been displaced from jobs at a higher rate. State-funded 
programs then provided coverage for low-income immigrant children. Since most non-CHIPRA states did 
not have a substitute state-funded program for immigrant children, uninsured rate among these group 
increased, resulting in statistically different trend in the public insurance coverage. Excluding time periods 
with economic turmoil then removes the existence of common-trend. In summary, the estimated effect of 
CHIPRA can be called a causal effect on the increase in public insurance coverage among low-income 
immigrant children.  
We also observe that adoption of CHIPRA has not created desired outcome for many states. Considerable 
state variation in the take-up rates exists following the passage of CHIPRA. We do some exploratory 
analysis among the gateway immigrant states: California, New York, New Jersey, Texas, Florida and 
Illinois. Bulk of immigrant population lives in these states. Among these states, California, New York, New 
Jersey and Illinois adopted the CHIPRA option and had a state-funded programs after welfare reform. 
Florida, in some counties, provide health insurance coverage using state-funded program, but did not adopt 
CHIPRA option. Texas did not have a state-funded program but adopted CHIPRA option. We can see from 
Figure 1 that, uninsured rate among immigrant children in Texas is the highest even after CHIRPA was 
adopted. On the contrary, average uninsured rate among immigrant children in states with state-funded 
programs is considerably lower, even before the adoption of. This may suggest the role of state-funded 
substitute program following the passage of PROWRA is a prerequisite for success of CHIPRA adoption.  
We also look into other measure of administrative features: income eligibility threshold, presumptive 
eligibility, Express Lane eligibility, that may contribute to differential success of CHIPRA. Information 
about out-reach programs is not available in this study. Success of programs for immigrant population often 
depends on increased resources in out-reach programs and reduction in administrative requirement(Aizer, 
2003; Wolfe & Scrivner, 2005). CHIPRA states vary considerably in terms of administrative requirement 
which may explain the variation in the success of CHIPRA. However, this study does not implement any 
regression model to ascertain the determinants of the success of CHIRPA.  
Like other studies regarding the immigrant population, we do not have information if a respondent in our 
sample is an undocumented immigrant. Undocumented immigrants do not qualify for any public assistance. 
If a state has large share of undocumented immigrants, then adoption of CHIPRA may not be as successful 
as desired since large share of immigrant population will not qualify for the coverage.  Specially, child 
outcome is subject to large fluctuation if parents are undocumented immigrant. On the other hand, 
humanitarian immigrants are also unidentified. This group qualify for all the public assistance. If any state, 
has large share of humanitarian immigrants, then they will have higher take-ups regardless of adoption of 
specific policy, like CHIPRA.  
Conclusion 
This study presents the estimates of the effects of CHIPRA adoption on the health insurance status of low-
income immigrant children. Our findings suggest that adoption of CHIPRA increases the take-up of public 
insurance by about 7 percentage points; we find a proportionate decline in the share of uninsured children 
among low-income immigrant children in policy states. No evidence of crowding out from private insurance 
suggests that take-up of public insurance is coming from those who had been previously uninsured. We 
estimate the labor market response among the mothers of immigrant children and find no evidence of 
negative labor market response which is consistent with the no crowding out effect on the private insurance.   
Our study also finds the effect of state-funded programs to provide health insurance to the immigrant 
children has profound effect on the success of CHIPRA adoption. Some states that did not have a substitute 
state-funded program during the passage of welfare reform, performed poorly even after CHIPRA option 
was adopted.  When we account for the existence of these state-funded programs in most CHIRPA states, 
we interpret the effect of CHIRPA on the increased health insurance coverage as a result of both policies. 
Future research could isolate the states that adopted CHIPRA but did not have a state-funded program   and 
compare the outcome to a group of states that neither adopted CHIPRA nor have a substitute program. 
Since immigrant population is highly concentrated among few states, this identification is difficult because 
of limited number of immigrant children in these states.   
Another observation emerges from this study: U.S.-born children of immigrants have better coverage in 
CHIRPA states, specially states that had state-funded programs for immigrant children. Since U.S.-born 
children was unlikely to be affected by the CHIPRA option directly, this observation could suggest two 
possible explanations: CHIPRA has positive spill-over effect on the U.S.-born children of immigrants.   Else 
we may suggest that states that adopted CHIPRA and instituted state-funded programs provides an 
accommodative environment for the immigrant population.  In other words, existence of state-funded 
programs for immigrant children have reduced the “chilling effect” in these states.  
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Table 2: Summary Statistics at Baseline (2008) for Immigrant Children 
 Immigrant Children 
 CHIPRA States Non-CHIPRA States 
 Mean SE Mean SE 
Age Group (0 to 5) 0.117 0.014 0.148 0.028 
Age Group (6 to 12) 0.385 0.020 0.397 0.026 
Age Group (13 to 18) 0.497 0.021 0.455 0.032 
White Non-Hispanic 0.114 0.021 0.089 0.020 
Hispanic 0.644 0.029 0.715 0.041 
Black 0.081 0.019 0.105 0.033 
Asian 0.149 0.018 0.091 0.029 
Family Income 29,839 1111.08 25,839 1841.55 
Mother's Education (High-
School or Above) 
0.504 0.029 0.552 0.047 
Below Poverty 0.379 0.029 0.454 0.044 
Uninsured Rate 0.311 0.027 0.574 0.044 
Public Insurance 0.465 0.028 0.193 0.035 
Employer Provided Insurance 0.222 0.020 0.197 0.032 
Private Insurance 0.261 0.023 0.240 0.039 
N 785 352 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics at Baseline (2008) for Native Children 
 U.S.-Born Children of Native Parents 
 CHIPRA States Non-CHIPRA States 
 Mean SE Mean SE 
Age Group (0 to 5) 0.317 0.007 0.344 0.006 
Age Group (6 to 12) 0.367 0.006 0.369 0.005 
Age Group (13 to 18) 0.316 0.006 0.287 0.005 
White Non-Hispanic 0.563 0.008 0.601 0.008 
Hispanic 0.169 0.008 0.068 0.005 
Black 0.210 0.007 0.281 0.006 
Asian 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.000 
Family Income 33,422 430.55 32,383 436.09 
Mother's Education (High-
School or Above) 
0.752 0.009 0.744 0.009 
Below Poverty 0.279 0.009 0.308 0.010 
Uninsured Rate 0.094 0.006 0.121 0.006 
Public Insurance 0.452 0.011 0.465 0.010 
Employer Provided 
Insurance 
0.421 0.010 0.429 0.010 
Private Insurance 0.479 0.009 0.456 0.009 
N 8950 8930 
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Table 4: Common-Trend Regressions for various DD Models 
 Common Trend Regression for Model 1 Common Trend Regression for Model 2 Common Trend Regression for Model 3 












CHIPRA # TREND=2 -0.0471 0.0503 0.00724 -0.0112 -0.0198 0.0335 -0.00439 -0.00143 -0.0140 
 (-1.03) (1.17) (0.18) (-0.29) (-0.75) (0.79) (-0.31) (-0.08) (-0.85) 
          
CHIPRA # TREND=3 -0.0193 0.00574 -0.0276 -0.0236 -0.0498 0.0718 -0.0121 0.00370 -0.00901 
 (-0.25) (0.14) (-0.38) (-0.76) (-1.47) (1.74) (-0.82) (0.17) (-0.44) 
          
CHIPRA # TREND=4 -0.0456 0.0545 -0.00995 0.0198 -0.0263 0.0162 -0.00949 0.0146 -0.00764 
 (-0.54) (0.97) (-0.17) (0.45) (-0.74) (0.40) (-0.63) (0.63) (-0.34) 
          
CHIPRA # TREND=5 -0.0301 0.0389 0.00463 -0.0321 -0.0519 0.0816 0.00584 -0.000852 -0.0180 
 (-0.37) (0.73) (0.08) (-0.63) (-1.56) (1.62) (0.38) (-0.03) (-0.82) 
          
CHIPRA # TREND=6 -0.140* 0.0394 0.109* -0.0325 -0.0353 0.0595 0.00455 -0.00370 -0.00530 
 (-2.05) (0.74) (2.52) (-0.82) (-0.90) (1.43) (0.28) (-0.17) (-0.24) 
          
CHIPRA # TREND=7 -0.0933 0.137* -0.00598 -0.0112 -0.0253 0.0394 0.000999 -0.0194 0.00249 
 (-1.11) (2.16) (-0.12) (-0.33) (-0.77) (0.95) (0.06) (-0.92) (0.11) 
          
CHIPRA # TREND=8 -0.0263 0.106 -0.0882 -0.0553 -0.0101 0.0650 -0.00770 0.00455 -0.0153 
 (-0.28) (1.89) (-1.45) (-1.21) (-0.24) (1.36) (-0.49) (0.21) (-0.77) 
          
CHIPRA # TREND=9 -0.107 0.153* -0.0136 -0.0541 0.00432 0.0540 -0.0110 -0.00306 0.0107 
 (-1.10) (2.58) (-0.23) (-1.23) (0.10) (1.47) (-0.57) (-0.12) (0.44) 
Observations 11266 11266 11266 50235 50235 50235 156233 156233 156233 
Adjusted R2 0.135 0.127 0.100 0.053 0.103 0.146 0.031 0.115 0.142 
t statistics in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Note: Model 1: Treatment Group: Immigrant Children living in CHIPRA States; Control Group: Immigrant Children living in non-CHIPRA States 
      Model 2: Treatment Group: Children of Immigrants living in CHIPRA States; Control Group: Children of Immigrants living in non-CHIPRA States 
      Model 3: Treatment Group: Children of Natives living in CHIPRA States; Control Group: Children of Natives living in non-CHIPRA States 
We only reported the coefficients on the interaction term between Treatment state and Trend terms. All the model has standard specifications. Sample restricted 
for the years between 2000 and 2008. Other covariates include: Treatment indicator, Trend Variable, individual characteristics like age, race, family income, 
mother’s education, employment status of the household reference person, state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at state level.  
Table 5: Results from various Difference-in-Differences Regression Models 
 Regression Results of DD Model 1 Regression Results of DD Model 1 Regression Results of DD Model 1 












CHIPRA -0.190*** 0.107*** 0.0609*** -0.0233* 0.0490** 0.00247 -0.00813** -0.00728 0.0480*** 
 (-26.17) (11.65) (7.80) (-2.64) (3.51) (0.29) (-3.03) (-1.46) (12.30) 
          
POST -0.00828 0.209*** -0.190*** -0.115*** 0.306*** -0.172*** -0.0425** 0.179*** -0.112*** 
 (-0.15) (3.62) (-4.11) (-5.06) (7.80) (-5.26) (-3.18) (9.20) (-7.30) 
          
CHIPRA*POST -0.0834** 0.0704* 0.0254 -0.0246 0.0271 0.000139 -0.00745 0.0175 -0.00177 
 (-2.79) (2.19) (0.89) (-1.32) (0.87) (0.01) (-1.00) (1.23) (-0.17) 
          
          
CONSTANT 0.727*** 0.210*** 0.112* 0.268*** 0.691*** 0.0738 0.280*** 0.987*** -0.254*** 
 (18.53) (4.45) (2.48) (8.44) (26.29) (1.96) (24.68) (49.43) (-12.17) 
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 15,313 15,313 15,313 77,165 77,165 77,165 222,578 222,578 222,578 
Adjusted R2 0.151 0.136 0.107 0.048 0.122 0.147 0.027 0.123 0.147 
t statistics in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Note: DD Model 1: Treatment Group: Immigrant Children living in CHIPRA States; Control Group: Immigrant Children living in non-CHIPRA States 
          DD Model 2: Treatment Group: Children of Immigrants living in CHIPRA States; Control Group: Children of Immigrants living in non-CHIPRA States 
          DD Model 3: Treatment Group: Children of Natives living in CHIPRA States; Control Group: Children of Natives living in non-CHIPRA States 
We only reported the coefficients on the interaction term between Treatment state and Trend terms. All the model has standard specifications. Sample is 
restricted for families with income below 300 percent of federal poverty line. Other covariates include: Treatment indicator, Trend Variable, individual 
characteristics like age, race, family income, mother’s education, employment status of the household reference person, state fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at state level.  
 
Table 6: US-Born Children of Immigrants compared to Native Children 
 CHIPRA States Non-CHIPRA States 
 Uninsurance Public Insurance Private Insurance Uninsurance Public Insurance Private Insurance 
NATIVITY 0.0574*** -0.000856 -0.0690*** 0.0710*** -0.0415** -0.0537*** 
 (5.19) (-0.07) (-4.52) (4.77) (-2.91) (-4.61) 
       
POST -0.0629*** 0.214*** -0.120*** -0.0514** 0.200*** -0.123*** 
 (-4.09) (11.03) (-7.58) (-2.94) (7.45) (-5.88) 
       
NATIVITY*POST -0.0428*** 0.0542*** -0.0237** -0.0294 0.0466 -0.0193 
 (-5.16) (8.07) (-3.06) (-1.43) (1.62) (-1.26) 
       
       
Constant 0.280*** 0.844*** -0.112** 0.286*** 0.992*** -0.255*** 
 (10.34) (35.64) (-3.40) (19.07) (37.94) (-8.60) 
Observations 178,740 178,740 178,740 121,003 121,003 121,003 
Adjusted R2 0.043 0.124 0.168 0.041 0.123 0.163 
t statistics in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Note:  
CHIPRA States Model: Treatment Group: Children of Immigrants living in CHIPRA States; Control Group: Children of Natives living in CHIPRA States         
Non-CHIPRA States Model: Treatment Group: Children of Immigrants living in Non-CHIPRA States; Control Group: Children of Natives living in Non-
CHIPRA States         
We only reported the coefficients on the interaction term between Treatment state and Trend terms. All the model has standard specifications. Sample is 
restricted for families with income below 300 percent of federal poverty line. Other covariates include: Treatment indicator, Trend Variable, individual 
characteristics like age, race, family income, mother’s education, employment status of the household reference person, state fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at state level.  
 
 
Table 7: Difference-in-Difference-Differences Regression Result 
 Uninsurance Public Insurance Private Insurance 
CHIPRA -0.00807** -0.0124* 0.0523*** 
 (-3.12) (-2.44) (13.47) 
    
POST -0.0418** 0.183*** -0.117*** 
 (-3.19) (9.99) (-7.70) 
    
NATIVITY 0.355*** -0.186*** -0.199*** 
 (13.99) (-6.15) (-13.81) 
    
CHIPRA*POST -0.00824 0.0177 -0.00104 
 (-1.11) (1.24) (-0.10) 
    
CHIPRA*NATIVITY -0.114** 0.103 0.0135 
 (-2.82) (1.96) (0.59) 
    
NATIVITY*POST -0.0116 0.00361 -0.00213 
 (-0.46) (0.14) (-0.08) 
    
CHIPRA*NATIVITY*POST -0.0593 0.0294 0.0293 
 (-1.84) (0.89) (0.94) 
    
    
CONSTANT 0.286*** 0.945*** -0.217*** 
 (23.63) (48.80) (-10.16) 
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y 
State Fixed Effect Y Y Y 
N 237,891 237,891 237,891 
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.117 0.160 
t statistics in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Table 8: Labor Market Effects on Mothers of Immigrant 
 Single Mother Married Mothers All Mothers 
CHIPRA 0.0472 0.0404** 0.0496*** 
 (1.28) (3.32) (5.91) 
    
POST -0.0575 -0.0675* -0.0653* 
 (-0.86) (-2.10) (-2.25) 
    
CHIPRA*POST -0.0224 0.0166 0.00501 
 (-0.70) (0.56) (0.28) 
    
Age 0.000777 -0.0000889 0.000220 
 (1.24) (-0.13) (0.42) 
    
    
Hispanic 0.0368 -0.0209 -0.00311 
 (1.35) (-1.35) (-0.22) 
    
Black Non-Hispanic 0.0132 -0.0429 -0.0259 
 (0.44) (-1.60) (-1.15) 
    
Asian-Non-Hispanic 0.00910 0.0208 0.0194 
 (0.24) (0.85) (0.80) 
    
Other Non-Hispanic 0.0929* -0.151 -0.101 
 (2.56) (-2.01) (-1.58) 
    
Total Children in the Family -0.0171* -0.00250 -0.00664 
 (-2.42) (-0.62) (-2.00) 
    
Log of Family Income 0.0303*** 0.0376*** 0.0329*** 
 (4.67) (4.20) (6.78) 
    
Education  0.0597*** 0.0286** 0.0390*** 
 (5.48) (2.97) (4.92) 
    
State Unemployment Rate -0.0142 -0.00912 -0.0106* 
 (-1.33) (-1.80) (-2.54) 
    
SINGLE MOM   0.0475*** 
   (5.30) 
    
Constant 0.755*** 0.518*** 0.594*** 
 (8.06) (5.27) (9.44) 
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y 
State Fixed Effect Y Y Y 
N 2,203 4,389 6,589 
Adjusted R2 0.167 0.130 0.140 
t statistics in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Note: Dependent Variable in each regression model is “Employed” a Binary variable, equal to 1 if the individual is employed and 
0 if individual is not employed. Linear Probability Model is estimated where our main variable of interest is the interaction term 
between CHIPRA (takes a value of 1 if the mother of immigrant lives in CHIPRA states) and POST (equal to 1 for each post 
treatment period). 
 
Figure 2: Comparative Performance Across CHIPRA States 
 





































































 Medicaid CHIP Medicaid CHIP Medicaid CHIP Medicaid CHIP 
  
California Yes N/A No N/A Yes N/A Yes N/A 250 27.42 
Colorado Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 205 1.48 
Connecticut Yes Yes No No No No No Yes 300 0.95 
Delaware No No No No No Yes No Yes 200 0.21 
District of Columbia No N/A No N/A No N/A No N/A 300 0.25 
Hawaii No N/A No N/A No N/A No N/A 300 0.19 
Illinois Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes 200 4.71 
Iowa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 200 0.33 
Maine No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 200 0.05 
Maryland No N/A No N/A No N/A Yes N/A 300 2.30 
Massachusetts No No No No No No No Yes 300 1.57 
Minnesota No N/A No N/A No N/A No N/A 280 0.77 
Montana Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No 175  
New Jersey Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 350 4.52 
New Mexico Yes N/A No N/A Yes N/A No N/A 235 0.62 
New York Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 400 7.72 
North Carolina No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 200 3.07 
Oregon No No No No Yes Yes No No 185 1.05 
Rhode Island No N/A No N/A No N/A No N/A 250 0.26 
Texas No No No No No Yes No Yes 200 13.35 
Virginia No No No No No No No No 200 2.47 
Washington No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 250 1.99 
Wisconsin Yes No No No No No No Yes 300 0.64 
Source: Various Policy Notes published by KFF. Income Eligibility threshold is that of year 2009.   
The share of undocumented immigrants across states is calculated from (Capps, Bachmeier, Fix, & Van Hook, 2013)  
